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# The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914

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Review: What Caused the Great War? - As we approach the centennial of World War I next year, the flow of books dissecting the Great War continues. Fortunately, in recent decades, the historical analysis of the War has become increasingly informed and sophisticated. No longer is the exclusive focus on "who" caused the war (traditionally the Germans and Kaiser Bill in particular); rather now the primary issues is "how" the war came about and the economic and political developments that facilitated it. While this is a much more complicated issue, much progress has been made as is evidenced in this fine book by Margaret MacMillan, the author of the magisterial "Paris 1919." While MacMillan does not resolve all issues, this is certainly the most complete analysis we have on how we got from 1870 to the fireworks of 1914. The hallmark of the author's "Paris 1919" was detailed examination of virtually every factor that played a role in hammering out the Versailles peace treaty ending the Great War. She follows that approach here as well, delivering 645 pages of text, supported by 39 pages of notes. This means that there is a lot of not always necessary detail in her discussion, but the reader is made aware of virtually every pertinent fact. Also, one of her strengths, particularly evident here, is that she focuses on the key individual actors (Sir Edward Grey and the Kaiser being just two examples), not just the big events, so that the reader develops somewhat a "feel" for the personality and outlook of these folks. After a helpful introduction, MacMillan sets the stage in her initial chapters by focusing on Europe in 1900 and then individual chapters on Germany, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, and Russia. This approach is somewhat reminiscent of Tuchman's "The Proud Tower" though much more thoroughly done here. Sprinkled within these chapters are discussions of key issues such as the competition for colonies (a key irritant to Germany); the German-British naval rivalry, including development of the powerful Dreadnought; the uncomfortable relationship between France and Britain; German ties to Austria-Hungary; and the puzzling role of Russia and the Tsar in these developments. The key actors emerge with a good degree of clarity: Nicholas the Tsar; Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary; the key British politicians involved (including a very young Churchill pictured on the book's cover with Kaiser Bill); the Kaiser and his uncle Edward VII; and the somewhat perplexed French leadership. MacMillan then unleashes some of her most important chapters where she clarifies issues that at least to me have been somewhat confusing. One of her best chapters ("What Were They Thinking?") expands on one of her concerns evident throughout the book: how could a prosperous and technologically progressive Europe ever have gotten into this mess? She then discusses in depth those famous war plans and alliance commitments that played such a great role in Tuchman's "The Guns of August." Here she corrects and refines Tuchman's enormous reliance upon these factors which Tuchman believed led to virtually an automatic march to war with little human control. She follows this up with thorough examinations of some key precursors to the war: the Morocco Crises and the Balkan Wars (which I never thought from other books I would ever begin to understand). Then it is to Sarajevo and the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand. By this point, we see Europe buried in kindling just awaiting the match to set things off. A discussion of the mechanics of the formal war process and the last week of peace, and an insightful epilogue, wrap up the book. In her intro, MacMillan suggests that we probably may never know all the factors that "caused" the Great War. But we certainly are significantly closer to that goal thanks to this fine book. Her joint focus on events and individual personalities (and weaknesses) helps establish a context for how the war exploded that is comprehensive and rarefied.
Review: Excellent for the initiated,unsuitable for the general public - We will never know exactly all the whys and hows of the FirstWW.All actors are long gone and we are trying to deduce conclusions from shadows and footprints and a scholarship that has produced thousands of volumes on the subject.There are now possibly fifty books that if all are read we can have an accurate enough understanding of what happened.This is one of those books,mainly addressed to the initiated British Public that has already read the basics The work has two main assets.First the long time span examined up to August 1914 and second the broadness of scope in the examination of the many facets that composed the perception of National Interest for every Nation and their interplay with the corresponding ones of the other Nations. Prof Mac Millan's work is clear,well researched,analytical and intelligently critical,particularly of other Nations not Britain,methodical and easy to follow in its rationale.Most of the arguments advanced are solidly based on facts and logic. Certain passages could have been eliminated to the benefit of the coherence and readability of the book.It is tiring to read the relations of the deputy minister of the Foreign Office of Germany with the second cousin of the Secretary of the War Office of Russia. The author cautions to the dangers of the assumption that the War was bound to happen,although reading the book one wonders how it could have been avoided in view of the strength of the usual suspects presented and analysed,Militarism,Nationalism,Social Darwinism etc. The author points out significantly that the War happened as a result of decisions taken by relatively few key Players,as a result of various pressures well identified and described in the book and that this happened over a considerable period of time. The final result was the failure of those Statesmen to rationally manage the ultimate crisis. Although not condemned expressis verbis ,Germany and A-H come out as the principals responsible for the War for the well known reasons. Kaiser Bill was already sketched as a caricature by many Historians but Mac Millan's one is in full color. The author presents both the forces of Societies defending Peace and those pushing towards War.Her understanding of military matters is weak. She makes a valid point that the Civilian Leaderships were not ensnared by the military train timetables,but rather by their own decisions not to insist on better understanding with their Military and demand military planning flexibility and options. On the surprise that the author is showing that military plans were aggressive,this is the military Dogma throughout the ages. On the Schlieffen plan,instead of this or any other author,the reader is referred to T. Zuber's "The Real German War Plan 1904-14" which is the only work that puts this much misunderstood plan in its real dimensions. The statement by Prof Mac Millan that on the eve of the Great War the French Army was poorly led and overly bureaucratic is unfair . This Army was certainly better and more efficiently led than the BEF,the victorious Marne battle is the final proof.The flexibility with which more than half of its right wing was rapidly transferred to the centre and left shows that it was both strategically perceptive and administratively capable. The moral failure of the German and BEF leaderships contrasts starkly with the rock solid and unflappable French one. While the author devotes irrelevant pages to the History of the Ottoman Empire (a St Antony trait),she gives only a few paragraphs to describe the schemings of Sir Edward Gray and the machinations of Gen. Henry Wilson to fight alongside France without Cabinet approval and Parliamentary knowledge.There is a curious reluctance of British Historians who are the only ones that can do a Fritz Fischer on British Policy of those times but avoid it.Prof Clark was the only one who provided some information so far. Finally having read extensively on WW1 I have ceased to be surprised that the primary responsibility of Serbia is passed over once again.I did not find any originality in the conclusions but the work is solid and in line with current scholarship, although I would prefer to see the author take a clear position as to the responsibility of the States for the War.Fritz Fisher did the dirty job indicting his own Country but Prof Mac Millan after exposing Germany and Austria avoids the final step,and she is not alone.AJP Taylor was more cantankerous but he had the strength of his convictions. DVK

## Technical Specifications

| Specification | Value |
|---------------|-------|
| Best Sellers Rank | #123,668 in Books ( See Top 100 in Books ) #1 in World War I History (Books) #3 in European Politics Books #171 in German History (Books) |
| Customer Reviews | 4.4 out of 5 stars 2,282 Reviews |

## Images

![The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914 - Image 1](https://m.media-amazon.com/images/I/81sy5oI-ZGL.jpg)

## Customer Reviews

### ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ What Caused the Great War?
*by R***K on December 9, 2013*

As we approach the centennial of World War I next year, the flow of books dissecting the Great War continues. Fortunately, in recent decades, the historical analysis of the War has become increasingly informed and sophisticated. No longer is the exclusive focus on "who" caused the war (traditionally the Germans and Kaiser Bill in particular); rather now the primary issues is "how" the war came about and the economic and political developments that facilitated it. While this is a much more complicated issue, much progress has been made as is evidenced in this fine book by Margaret MacMillan, the author of the magisterial "Paris 1919." While MacMillan does not resolve all issues, this is certainly the most complete analysis we have on how we got from 1870 to the fireworks of 1914. The hallmark of the author's "Paris 1919" was detailed examination of virtually every factor that played a role in hammering out the Versailles peace treaty ending the Great War. She follows that approach here as well, delivering 645 pages of text, supported by 39 pages of notes. This means that there is a lot of not always necessary detail in her discussion, but the reader is made aware of virtually every pertinent fact. Also, one of her strengths, particularly evident here, is that she focuses on the key individual actors (Sir Edward Grey and the Kaiser being just two examples), not just the big events, so that the reader develops somewhat a "feel" for the personality and outlook of these folks. After a helpful introduction, MacMillan sets the stage in her initial chapters by focusing on Europe in 1900 and then individual chapters on Germany, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, and Russia. This approach is somewhat reminiscent of Tuchman's "The Proud Tower" though much more thoroughly done here. Sprinkled within these chapters are discussions of key issues such as the competition for colonies (a key irritant to Germany); the German-British naval rivalry, including development of the powerful Dreadnought; the uncomfortable relationship between France and Britain; German ties to Austria-Hungary; and the puzzling role of Russia and the Tsar in these developments. The key actors emerge with a good degree of clarity: Nicholas the Tsar; Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary; the key British politicians involved (including a very young Churchill pictured on the book's cover with Kaiser Bill); the Kaiser and his uncle Edward VII; and the somewhat perplexed French leadership. MacMillan then unleashes some of her most important chapters where she clarifies issues that at least to me have been somewhat confusing. One of her best chapters ("What Were They Thinking?") expands on one of her concerns evident throughout the book: how could a prosperous and technologically progressive Europe ever have gotten into this mess? She then discusses in depth those famous war plans and alliance commitments that played such a great role in Tuchman's "The Guns of August." Here she corrects and refines Tuchman's enormous reliance upon these factors which Tuchman believed led to virtually an automatic march to war with little human control. She follows this up with thorough examinations of some key precursors to the war: the Morocco Crises and the Balkan Wars (which I never thought from other books I would ever begin to understand). Then it is to Sarajevo and the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand. By this point, we see Europe buried in kindling just awaiting the match to set things off. A discussion of the mechanics of the formal war process and the last week of peace, and an insightful epilogue, wrap up the book. In her intro, MacMillan suggests that we probably may never know all the factors that "caused" the Great War. But we certainly are significantly closer to that goal thanks to this fine book. Her joint focus on events and individual personalities (and weaknesses) helps establish a context for how the war exploded that is comprehensive and rarefied.

### ⭐⭐⭐⭐ Excellent for the initiated,unsuitable for the general public
*by D***S on November 9, 2013*

We will never know exactly all the whys and hows of the FirstWW.All actors are long gone and we are trying to deduce conclusions from shadows and footprints and a scholarship that has produced thousands of volumes on the subject.There are now possibly fifty books that if all are read we can have an accurate enough understanding of what happened.This is one of those books,mainly addressed to the initiated British Public that has already read the basics The work has two main assets.First the long time span examined up to August 1914 and second the broadness of scope in the examination of the many facets that composed the perception of National Interest for every Nation and their interplay with the corresponding ones of the other Nations. Prof Mac Millan's work is clear,well researched,analytical and intelligently critical,particularly of other Nations not Britain,methodical and easy to follow in its rationale.Most of the arguments advanced are solidly based on facts and logic. Certain passages could have been eliminated to the benefit of the coherence and readability of the book.It is tiring to read the relations of the deputy minister of the Foreign Office of Germany with the second cousin of the Secretary of the War Office of Russia. The author cautions to the dangers of the assumption that the War was bound to happen,although reading the book one wonders how it could have been avoided in view of the strength of the usual suspects presented and analysed,Militarism,Nationalism,Social Darwinism etc. The author points out significantly that the War happened as a result of decisions taken by relatively few key Players,as a result of various pressures well identified and described in the book and that this happened over a considerable period of time. The final result was the failure of those Statesmen to rationally manage the ultimate crisis. Although not condemned expressis verbis ,Germany and A-H come out as the principals responsible for the War for the well known reasons. Kaiser Bill was already sketched as a caricature by many Historians but Mac Millan's one is in full color. The author presents both the forces of Societies defending Peace and those pushing towards War.Her understanding of military matters is weak. She makes a valid point that the Civilian Leaderships were not ensnared by the military train timetables,but rather by their own decisions not to insist on better understanding with their Military and demand military planning flexibility and options. On the surprise that the author is showing that military plans were aggressive,this is the military Dogma throughout the ages. On the Schlieffen plan,instead of this or any other author,the reader is referred to T. Zuber's "The Real German War Plan 1904-14" which is the only work that puts this much misunderstood plan in its real dimensions. The statement by Prof Mac Millan that on the eve of the Great War the French Army was poorly led and overly bureaucratic is unfair . This Army was certainly better and more efficiently led than the BEF,the victorious Marne battle is the final proof.The flexibility with which more than half of its right wing was rapidly transferred to the centre and left shows that it was both strategically perceptive and administratively capable. The moral failure of the German and BEF leaderships contrasts starkly with the rock solid and unflappable French one. While the author devotes irrelevant pages to the History of the Ottoman Empire (a St Antony trait),she gives only a few paragraphs to describe the schemings of Sir Edward Gray and the machinations of Gen. Henry Wilson to fight alongside France without Cabinet approval and Parliamentary knowledge.There is a curious reluctance of British Historians who are the only ones that can do a Fritz Fischer on British Policy of those times but avoid it.Prof Clark was the only one who provided some information so far. Finally having read extensively on WW1 I have ceased to be surprised that the primary responsibility of Serbia is passed over once again.I did not find any originality in the conclusions but the work is solid and in line with current scholarship, although I would prefer to see the author take a clear position as to the responsibility of the States for the War.Fritz Fisher did the dirty job indicting his own Country but Prof Mac Millan after exposing Germany and Austria avoids the final step,and she is not alone.AJP Taylor was more cantankerous but he had the strength of his convictions. DVK

### ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ The War that Ended Peace
*by J***R on March 6, 2014*

As we approach the centennial anniversary of the outbreak of World War One we should pause to reflect on the terrible loss that conflict brought. In terms of western culture, 1914 was truly a watershed year that ended one way of life and introduced another. Margaret MacMillan followed up her epic study of the Versailles Treaty with this equally impressive work. She attempts to show how the war came about primarily because too many people either wanted war or did not do enough to prevent it from happening. The result is perhaps the most thorough analysis of the pre-1914 world available to the modern reader. MacMillan begins her book with an account of the major players (France, Germany, Russia, Britain, and Austria-Hungary) to illustrate their national hopes and dreams pitted against their fears and suspicions andn introduces the reader to the primary individuals who helped shape national policy. She then looks at the psychology of war and the peace efforts and compares them to the militarism that each nation experienced. She describes how the new concept of public opinion helped drive the leaders towards certain decisions. Next she looks at the series of run ups to the Great War's outbreak, Morocco, Bosnia, the Balkan Wars, and even the assassination of the Austrian archduke and his wife. None of these events meant that war was ultimiately inevitable. So long as there were at least some key players willing to negotiate and work through differences, war could be avoided. MacMillan concludes that war came about because the forces that sought it outnumbered and outmanourvered those who did not. But she also works to debunk myths that have evolved over the years. Germany and the Kaiser were not solely responsible for war in 1914. Germany had repeated backed down in the face of international pressure during the Morocco crises of 1905 and 1911. The Kaiser, while having the personality that modern day people would call a "jerk" (or worse), had a way of standing down at the last minute. Granted, he was fascinated with all things military, he was the inheritor of the Prussian military tradition, but he did not set out to bring war upon the world as he has often been blamed for doing. She also critiques the Anglo-French entente that developed after 1904. Britain and France were not a unified front as British leaders continually looked for ways to be non-committal in backing France on international affairs. She also looks at the relationship between France and Russia, and considers the challenges facing Austria-Hungary and the upstart Serbia. All of these have had myths develop around them and MacMillan works through the hyperbole to understand the root causes of national decisions. In fact, MacMillan ultimately blames no one and everyone for the war. The Great War, and she uses this term throughout the book, was the sum total of government's unwillingness to resort to diplomacy when the world needed eiplomacy the most. MacMillan is not only a fine historian but is also an excellent writer. Thoughout the book she interjects modern analogies to compare with her subject matter to help illustrate her points. One key such analogy appears near the end of the book when she states how John F. Kennedy employed diplomacy against the advice of his advisors in part because he had recently read Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August. Kennedy gave diplomacy a chance, the players of 1914 did not. MacMillan's writing style is crisp and lively. Truly, there is never a dull moment in this book. College history courses should utilize this book. The leaders of today should read this book. The average citizen who thinks that guns and war solve problems should read this book. There are lessons to be learned from MacMillan that need to be understood and appreciated. This book has all the makings of a Pulitzer Prize and as such cannot be discounted by anyone who is in the position of decision-making in international affairs. And on a large scale, that really means all of us, as public opinion is now counted for much by politicians and pollsters. This book should remain the standard for a long time to come, much like her work in Paris 1919 remains the standard for understanding our modern world as it resulted from the Paris peace conference.

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