The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and Al-Qaeda

If you're looking for a contemporary analysis of America's enduring war with al Qaeda you'll be hardpressed to find a better expert than Peter Bergen. As "director of the national security studies program at the New America Foundation in Washington D.C.; a research fellow at New York University's Center on Law and Security and CNN's national security analyst..., Adjunct Lecturer at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University [2008]and he has worked as an Adjunct Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University," Bergen has few peers ([...]). His latest work is likely one of the more critical insights into our handling of the fight against al-Qaeda.With Bergen's qualifications beyond question The Longest War is a riveting read, his cerebral analysis is both illuminating and thorough, and at times punctuated with snippets of humor - Saddam Hussein admitting he had no WMD's for example, the US and the UN destroyed them in the 1990's, but he kept up the illusion to keep Iran at bay. Bergen confesses to interviewing some 700 people for the book, ranging from former al-Qaeda operatives to former staffers of the Bush administration and security agencies. In short, it is comprehensive.Bergen is uncompromising in his critique of the handling of America's response to al-Qaeda, particularly the Bush administration. While he concedes they prevented large scale attacks on our homeland, he leaves few stones unturned as he sifts through the systemic failures which likely allowed the attacks of 9/11 to occur in the first place and our failure to capture bin Laden in the 2001 battle of Tora Bora.According to Bergen the days of the Bush administration make for grim reading. They are littered with issues of human rights abuses, such as the 183 waterboarding procedures (which were banned in 2003) on Sheik Khalid Mohammed while in US custody, competing and conflicting policies between various government agencies, the convoluted and protracted campaign in Iraq, and finally the misdirection of policies in Afghanistan.A great book, filled with exceptional examples and definitely recommended reading.

This isn't something for faint-hearted or zealous partisan readers. But readers who care about national security and follow war events closely will applaud the quality research behind this remarkably objective publication. Anyway, that's my take.The Vulcans organized our response to 9/11, generally with public support here and abroad. But the picture quickly darkened as it became apparent we were in over our head with no credible grand strategy. Maybe the Vulcans should have spent more time at the forge than sniffing each other's musk. This might have caused us to recalibrate some our efforts sooner, instead of waiting until after the 2008 election.Almost anyone who has served in the White House, Pentagon or war theater understands the importance of positive metrics to reinforce the wisdom of those in charge. Analysts who are less optimistic simply disappear, and their charts shredded. In fact, honest doubters should be brought into the fold immediately, instead of being dismissed for disloyalty. Although unstated, this is certainly a supportable inference from The Longest War.From 2003 to 2006 there was nothing but good news from the Green Zone, until even party loyalists could not paper over distressing reports of the ethnic turmoil in Iraq that was destroying the nation's social fabric from within. What saved the day, temporarily at least, was the Surge that helped put the exiled Sunnis back in the game from which they were ousted by Ambassador Bremer in 2003. We don't know yet how the Kurds, Sunnis and Shia will resolve their differences, but we're reasonably confident that Al Qaeda doesn't have the power it once did to create mayhem. Like him or not, the Surge would not have happened without the support of President Bush.In a similar vein, President Obama inherited a mess in Afghanistan but he's behaving more aggressively than his predecessor who showed far more interest from the git-go in liberating Baghdad than Kabul. This is a bit of a surprise, considering the rhetoric of the Obama campaign.My favorite quote is from Colonel Patrick Lang, talking about human intelligence (HUMINT) in the final chapter about why we haven't yet found bin Laden."Everyone talks about effective HUMINT, but nothing is happening. The people who do this kind of work are gifted eccentrics, who the bureaucrats don't like, or they are the criminal types, who the lawyers don't like."I think the book would have been a little stronger if Bergen focused more on our failure to have a strategy for what we want to accomplish in the long run, rather than short-term objectives, attainable or not in the near term. It will be interesting to read how former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld treats some of these issues in his upcoming book.

A mine of information

Great

A very good single source on the war on terror, in both scope and clarity. Concisely encompasses many of the narratives of the last 10 years in military/security/terroism nexus, including The Looming Tower, Fiasco, The Gamble, and Obama's War. Easy to read and very well researched.Poor intro chapter and slightly weaker on Afghan lose a star, but highly recommended overall.