Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns (Great Campaigns of the Civil War)

I got this in order to understand this battle. I've visited the battlefield so I was lucky enough to obtain one of the information battlefield maps issued by the Park Rangers. The landscape descriptions in this book can't have been easy to put into words, and without the map I dare say I would of lost that side of the story. However, overall this is a very good book, it really does make the strategic side of the battle easy to understand, simple really.

I stumbled upon this title by accident, when I was looking for Civil War books about Tennessee. I am very happy that I did. The book was an easy read, but not so easy that I flew through it without learning anything. One of the best things about the book was Woodworth's writting style. He wrote it in such away that I felt I was there, living these events with the generals and the soldiers from both sides. Having hiked the regions that the events took place in helped too, but even if you have not the descriptions are very strong. He never writes over your head like he expects you to be a Civil War historian, nor does he dumb it down to a fifth grade level. The transitions from the North's side to the South's side of the conflict was brilliantly done. Nothing was left out in going from one side to the other. If events were taking place at the same time Woodworth let you know. When he talked of the battles they were well layed out as to who was doing what,where and when. The thing that I learned most from this book was the internal bickering in the South's upper chain of command. No one was doing what they were suppose to do when they were suppose to do it. It would seem to me,after reading this book, if the generals under Bragg's command would have done as they were told the outcome would have been totally different and maybe even the outcome of the Civil war itself. If you are from Chattanooga or Knoxville, I highly recommend reading this book. If you just like reading Civil War histories this is a must.

"Six armies in Tennessee" is as its author describes a "narrative synthesis" of the western theater in late 1863 as portions of four Union and two Confederate armies gather to contend for Middle and Eastern Tennessee. As a student growing up in the South and then as a casual Civil War reader, I believed the Union Army was run by incompetent, blundering generals, at least in the early years of the war. This belief was likely due to the revolving door of leadership of the Army of the Potomac prior to Grant. Yet, as I have read more over the years, I continually learn more about the errant leadership of the Confederacy. I think the legend surrounding Lee masks this to those with only a passing interest, but as one ventures into more detailed studies, particularly from recent authors who are freed from the burden of Confederate apologetics, you find some eye-opening material. In most cases, it's not that the Confederate generals were incompetent in a military sense; rather, they fall prey to extreme arrogance and pride and cannot work together in the best interests of the CSA.Yet "Six Armies" presents CSA leadership in a lower low. That arrogance is compounded by extreme incompetency and insubordination. Woodworth is the first author I have read who does not portray Braxton Bragg as the sole reason the South lost the campaign: "Bragg's worst problem ... was that he had few capable generals who trusted him and whom he could trust to carry out his commands." In fact, Woodworth calls Bragg's staff a "bitter concoction of hatred and mistrust that poisoned the army's operations... The Army of Tennessee's high command was a tangled mess of bitterness, jealousy, and hatred. It was now nearing the point of ceasing to function." Dysfunction was so great that they wouldn't even talk to each other obviously resulting in egregious lapses in communications which significantly impeded their effectiveness.Bragg was a good administrator and decent tactician who sincerely tried to win the goodwill of subordinates and superiors, but was decidedly bereft of political and personal skills. Leonidas Polk, whose "continued presence was a tumor on the Army of Tennessee's high command", was a petty and incompetent general, but magnificent politician that continuously undermined Bragg. Hindman, Hardee, Hill, and even Buckner blatantly defied orders and squandered multiple opportunities to destroy Rosecrans in the whole well before Chickamauga. The reader cannot help but wince as they recklessly defy and countermand Bragg's - and each others - orders. And that includes, at least in the events during and after the Chattanooga siege - even Longstreet (In fact, Woodworth is no fan of Lee's "Old Warhorse" and presents one of the most unflattering portrayals I have read). Ultimately, the fault must lie with Jefferson Davis and his poor administrative capabilities, his insecurities which manifested in misguided loyalties, and as Woodworth says, "his questionable penchant for viewing the western theater as the land of second chance for generals whose careers had gone awry."Woodworth presents a balanced treatment of both sides, but the Confederate coverage resonates as he lets his readers see how the Army of Tennessee's campaign disintegrates moment by moment. Despite the loss at Chickamauga, the army of the Cumberland is able to capitalize on the continued mistakes of Bragg et al. Woodworth certainly has some opinions. I certainly don't see his treatment as complete absolution for Bragg, but it certainly attempts to lessen the disgrace that has been heaped upon him over the years. Foote was pretty rough on Bragg in his second book  The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 2: Fredericksburg to Meridian , but he does hint at much of the dysfunction with the subordinates, especially in his first volume  The Civil War: A Narrative--Fort Sumter to Perryville, Vol. 1 .My biggest complaint with "Six Armies" - apart from the paucity of maps typical in most of these books - is that Woodworth ends his coverage of the campaign prematurely. The narrative basically closes with Bragg's retreat from the Chattanooga siege. The whole Knoxville debacle only gets a few pages. And there the author lays some harsh criticisms of Longstreet, calling him incompetent, no less. While I cannot dispute those charges, they certainly deserve more supporting proof and reasoning. While the book is well-written and provides a great overview without deep dives into battle minutia, I struggled between a three and four stars rating because of this. In the end, I decided to rate with the latter simply because I very much enjoyed reading it. The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 2: Fredericksburg to MeridianThe Civil War: A Narrative--Fort Sumter to Perryville, Vol. 1

Woodworth' book was highly recommended by one of my fellow students of the Civil War during a tour of the Appomattox campaign this past spring. I have read a number of books over the years but this book covers the campaign in approximately 250 pages. The challenge is learning the geography of the land while reading of Rosecrans' maneuvers that were most successful aided by the failures of Bragg's subordinates particularly the failure to attack an isolated corps in McLemore's Cove. Woodworth does an excellent evaluation of the fascinating command failures in Bragg's Army of a Tennessee. Although Bragg's personality seems to have contributed to the worst morale and insubordination of either army, Woodworth agrees with Dr. James Robertson that Bragg was one of the south's more aggressive generals and organizer who was plagued by one of the worst command detractors and incompetents, Bishop Polk who helped infect the command. Woodworth has no sympathy for Longstreet who I suspect was affected by the epidemic of mistrust in Bragg particularly after Davis' open counsel in front of the division and corps commanders. Covering such a wide breath, maps are always a necessity and I suggest using maps from other sources to aid in following the movements of Rosecrans. The excellent Civil War Trust maps are very helpful for following the Chickamauga battle as well as Missionary Ridge, Thomas's great defense in the former and the shocking results of what was supposed to be a diversion in the latter. For an overview of the campaign, there is none better.

I love reading about the Civil War and have read many authors writing on many subjects. Wanting to enhance my knowledge of the Western Theatre campaigns I chose this book. Everyone has their own writing style...I understand that but this book is so dry and lack luster that I just didn't enjoy it. First there are not enough maps to help the reader understand this complicated battle. I found myself reading and re-reading certain parts and using supplemental books and maps to try and understand the geography and troop movements. As I read this book I was reminded of lectures I sat thru in college where the professor was devoid of any personality and just covered a the subject in a droning, boring and uninspiring way. Don't get me wrong. The material is covered and the details are there but before I re-read this book again there are plenty of others I would reach for to read again ...or find a new one that covers things in a bit more interesting way.

These campaigns are well covered by the author, who writes highly readable histories of the Civil War. This account explains why Union General Rosecrans was successful to a point, but seemingly lost his head at Chickamauga when the battle got out of hand. As well, the author Woodworth lays out why Rosecrans was sacked, discussing three aspects of that decision: Ol' Rosie's meticulous planning that led to his paralysis when things were not perfect, Rosecrans' inability to see how his campaigns fit into the larger Union strategy of fighting the Confederate armies in the eastern and western theaters, and Lincoln's need to support the incumbent War Democrat candidate - also supported by Rosecrans - for Ohio governor against Copperhead candidate Clement Vallandigham. The book also treats Confederate General Longstreet's phlegmatic, to say the least, leadership when detached from the Army of Northern Virginia to work with Confederate Army of Tennessee commander Bragg, examining it in light of Longstreet's own aspirations for an independent command and his inability to figure out what Union General Grant was up to with regard to opening the "cracker line" to feed troops in Chattanooga. I found Woodworth's discussion tying Confederate General Lee's well-known practice of pitching his tent closest to Longstreet's while on other campaigns to the observation that some generals need more supervision than others has made me begin to rethink my view of Longstreet. Grant's frustration with Union General Thomas also is fodder here, although I'm still not clear on why this relationship was so poor.